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The Right to Silence v. The Fifth Amendment
Tracey Maclint

"'You have the right to remain silent.' It's probably the best known phrase to
emanate from our Constitution."
-ALAN
M. DERSHOWITZ, IS THERE A RIGHT TO REMAIN SILENT?: COERCIVE
INTERROGATION AND THE FIFTH AMENDMENT AFTER 9/11 xvii (2008).

"Rather than being a 'right of silence,' the right, or better the privilege, is against
being compelled to speak. This distinction is not mere semantics; it goes to the very
core of the problem."
-HENRY

FRIENDLY, BENCHMARKS 271 (1967).

I. INTRODUCTION
I want to thank Geoffrey Stone, Edward H. Levi Distinguished
Service Professor at the University of Chicago and the editors of The
University of Chicago Legal Forum for inviting me to participate in the
Legal Forum's 2015 Symposium on Policing the Police.' I will focus my
discussion on one Supreme Court ruling, Salinas v. Texas,2 because
what the Court says in its opinions often, but not always, matters to
the police. My topic concerns a well-known, but badly misunderstood,
constitutional right. The Fifth Amendment to the Constitution
guarantees, inter alia, that no person "shall be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself." 3 After the Court's ruling
in Salinas, the misunderstanding of this right has only grown.
t Professor of Law and Joseph Lipsitt Faculty Research Scholar at Boston University
School of Law. Thanks to Al Alschuler and Yale Kamisar for their comments after reading a draft
of this article.
1 2016 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 1.
2 133 S. Ct. 2174
(2013).
U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Supreme Court and legal scholars often describe the SelfIncrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment as a "privilege." See, e.g., R.H. HELMHOLZ ET AL.,
THE PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION: ITS ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT 1-2 (1997);

Salinas v. Texas, 133 S. Ct. 2174, 2178 (2013); Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314, 316 (1999).
"I call it a 'right' because it is one. Privileges are concessions granted by the government to its
subjects and may be revoked." LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT xv (2d ed.

1986). Levy explained that "[a]lthough the right against self-incrimination originated in England
as a common-law privilege, the Fifth Amendment made it a constitutional right, clothing it with
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For the non-lawyer, the Fifth Amendment protects an individual's
right to silence. I am confident that many Americans believe that the
Constitution, pursuant to the Fifth Amendment, protects their right to
remain silent when questioned by police officers or governmental
officials. 4 Countless television shows and movies have portrayed scenes
where police inform suspects of their right to remain silent. Typically,
cops on television are reciting the Miranda warnings to someone under
arrest. Those warnings require informing arrestees, among other
things, of their right to remain silent.5 Perhaps, because of the impact
of television and the movies, in 1974, Justice Rehnquist, who was no
fan of the holding in Miranda v. Arizona,6 wrote that "[a]t this point in
our history, virtually every schoolboy is familiar with the concept, if not
the language" of the Fifth Amendment. 7 Twenty-six years later, after
he had been elevated to the position of Chief Justice, Rehnquist again
spoke for a majority of the Court in a case that rejected a direct
challenge to Miranda when he stated that the Miranda warnings "have
become part of our national culture." The "concept" that has "become
part of our national culture" is the notion that individuals enjoy a right
to remain silent when questioned by police officials.
Other Justices, including liberal and conservative members of the
Court, have remarked on the ubiquity of the public's familiarity with
the right guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment. In a 1980 ruling
addressing whether a defendant's pre-arrest silence could be used for
the same status as other rights, like freedom of religion, that we would never denigrate by
describing them as mere privileges." Id. I describe the Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth
Amendment as a poorly understood right "despite-or perhaps in part because of-hundreds of
books, articles, and cases discussing the origin and breadth of the Fifth Amendment, significant
disagreement still persists concerning the scope and application of the right." Marcy Strauss,
Silence, 35 LOY. OF L.A. L. REV. 101, 152 (2001); cf. Stephen J. Schulhofer, Some Kind Words for
the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 26 VAL. U. L. REV. 311, 320 (1991) ("In spite of the many
Supreme Court opinions that laud the privilege in reverential terms, the precise purpose it serves
has never been adequately explained or defended.").
A survey conducted in 1991 found that eighty percent of Americans "said they were aware
that if they were arrested they were not required to answer a police officer's questions." Poll Finds
Only 33% Can Identify Bill of Rights, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 1991, at A33.
' See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966). Professor Frederick Schauer has stated
that the impact of American television and movies has made Miranda "the most famous appellate
case in the world." Frederick Schauer, The Miranda Warning, 88 WASH. L. REV. 155, 155 (2013).
Moreover, according to Schauer, the influence of Miranda has been so pervasive "that Russian
television cops give something like a Miranda warning to suspects even though no actual Russian
law imposes such an obligation on real Russian cops." Id. (footnote omitted).
6
384 U.S. 436 (1966).
Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 439 (1974). As the Fifth Circuit observed: "Most ten year
old children who are permitted to stay up late enough to watch police shows on television can
probably recite [the Miranda warnings] as well as any police officer." United States v. McCrary,
643 F.2d 323, 330 n.11 (5th Cir. 1981), quoted in Strauss, supra note 3, at 118 n.67.
Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 443 (2000).
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impeachment purposes at a later trial, Justice Marshall noted in a
dissenting opinion that, even when a person has not been formally
arrested, an individual may decide not to communicate with law
enforcement officials believing that the Fifth Amendment protects his
right not to do so.9 According to Justice Marshall, the Court should not
"assume that in the absence of official warnings individuals are
ignorant of or oblivious to their constitutional rights[.]"1 0 Even Justice
Scalia, another well-known critic of Miranda, found it "implausible"
that in "the modern age of frequently dramatized 'Miranda' warnings,"
a "person under investigation may be unaware of his right to remain
silent[.]" 1
If every schoolboy is familiar with the Fifth Amendment and if
knowledge of the right to remain silent is part of our national culture, it
is understandable why many persons believe they have a right to refuse
to answer a police officer's question if answering that question is
potentially incriminating. The flip side of this national understanding
is that much of the public also knows "that any statement made in the
presence of police 'can and will be used against you in a court of law.' 12
Accordingly, among the public, the right to remain silent is viewed as a
fundamental freedom. One scholar has written that the expression
"[y]ou have the right to remain silent," is "the best-known phrase to
emanate from the Constitution."1 3 Another scholar has opined that the
"right to remain silent sounds like a bedrock principle, and everyone

knows about

it."14

Hollywood screenwriters are not solely responsible for the
perception among the public that there is a right to remain silent.
Whether they are willing to admit it or not, the Justices also deserve
some credit (or blame) for the popular view that people have a right to

' See Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 247 (1980) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
10 Id.
1 Brogan v. United States, 522 U.S. 398, 405 (1998). Interestingly, Justice Scalia once
remarked in an opinion that "[w]hile every person is entitled to stand silent, it is more virtuous for
the wrongdoer to admit his offense and accept the punishment he deserves." Minnick v.
Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146, 167 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Whether Justice Scalia was
suggesting that everyone enjoys a constitutional right to remain silent is not clear.
" Weitzel v. State, 863 A.2d 999, 1004 (Md. 2004).
13
ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ, IS THERE A RIGHT TO REMAIN SILENT?: COERCIVE INTERROGATION
AND THE FIFTH AMENDMENT AFTER 9/11 xvii (2008).
14
See Orin Kerr, Do You Have A Right to Remain Silent? Thoughts on the "Sleeper"Criminal
Procedure Case of the Term, Salinas v. Texas, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (June 17, 2013),
http: /volokh.com/2013/06/17/do-you-have-a-right-to-remain-silent-thoughts-on-the-sleepercriminal-procedure-case-of-the-term-salinas-v-texas/
[https://perma.ccfT7SH-EXNL]; see also
LouIs MICHAEL SEIDMAN, SILENCE AND FREEDOM 1 (2007) (stating that the words "[y]ou have the

right to remain silent," taken from Miranda, "have had more impact on the public imagination
than any other phrase in the history of constitutional adjudication").
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remain silent when confronted by police questioning. Even before the
Court formally applied the Fifth Amendment's Self-Incrimination
Clause to the states, its Due Process rulings on whether a challenged
confession was properly admitted at a state prosecution acknowledged
a suspect's constitutional right to remain silent during police
interrogation.1 5 Indeed, in the case that applied the right against
compelled self-incrimination to the states, the Court stated that the
Fourteenth Amendment "secures against state invasion the same
privilege that the Fifth Amendment guarantees against federal
infringement-the right of a person to remain silent unless he chooses
to speak in the unfettered exercise of his own will, and to suffer no
penalty .

.

. for such silence." 16

'5 See, e.g., Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 516-17 (1963) (explaining that when the
fact-finder is determining the voluntariness and admissibility of a confession, the accused is
entitled to have the fact-finder know "that he [was] not cautioned [by police] that he may remain
silent, that he [was] not warned that his answers may be used against him, or that he [was] not
advised that he [was] entitled to counsel" while being questioned by police); Culombe v.
Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 610 (1961) (Opinion of Frankfurter, J.) ("There is no indication that at
any time [the suspect] was warned of his right to keep silent [by the police]."); Payne v. Arkansas,
356 U.S. 560, 567 (1958) (listing among the factors that showed the suspect's confession was
coerced and not an "expression of free choice," the fact that he "was not advised of his right to
remain silent or his right to counsel' (footnote omitted); Turner v. Pennsylvania, 338 U.S. 62, 64
(1949) (Opinion of Frankfurter, J.) (concluding that the suspect's confession was involuntary under
the Fourteenth Amendment because, inter alia, the police had "not informed [him] of his right to
remain silent until after he had been under the pressure of a long process of interrogation and had
actually yielded to it"); Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 54 (1949) (Opinion of Frankfurter, J.)
(noting that the "very relentlessness of [police] interrogation implies that it is better for the
prisoner to answer than to persist in the refusal of disclosure which is his constitutional right").
Of course, the substance of the right to remain silent was debatable prior to Miranda.
Professor Yale Kamisar has noted, correctly in my view, that before Mirandawas decided, "most
suspects did not know they had such a right (or, to put it another way, did not realize that the
police lacked any lawful authority to compel an answer). Moreover, the great majority of police
officers did nothing to correct this misimpression." Yale Kamisar, A Rejoinder to Professor
Schauer's Commentary, 88 WASH. L. REV. 171, 172 (2013) (footnote omitted). According to
Kamisar, practically speaking, prior to Miranda there was no right to remain silent during police
interrogation:

I would maintain that in the years before the police were required to inform suspects
that they had a right to remain silent-and the police did not have to do so until
Miranda instructed them that . .. they must do so-such a right did not exist. To put it
somewhat differently, I would say that requiring the police to warn custodial suspects
that they had a right to remain silent-which Miranda did for the first timeestablished such a right.
Id. at 173 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
'6 Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 8 (1964). One week after the announcement in Malloy that
the Fifth Amendment's Self-Incrimination Clause applied to the states, in a Sixth Amendment
right to counsel case that concluded a suspect had been denied access to counsel during a police
interrogation, the Court twice referenced a suspect's "absolute right to remain silent" during police
interrogation. See Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 485, 491 (1964) (noting as part of its holding
that police did not effectively warn the suspect "of his absolute constitutional right to remain
silent"). Escobedo also noted that the "Constitution ... strikes the balance in favor of the right of
the accused to be advised by his lawyer of his privilege against self-incrimination." Id. at 488
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The public's understanding of their right to remain silent has also
developed from the Court's rulings interpreting the Fifth Amendment
during the 1960s. As Professor Albert Alschuler has explained in an
influential law review article, the Court's rulings have "vacillated
between two incompatible readings of the Fifth Amendment[J"

17

One

interpretation of the amendment affords individuals a right to remain
silent.1 8 This view fuels the public's perception that individuals enjoy a
right to silence when interacting with the police. 19 Under this "right to
silence" interpretation of the Fifth Amendment, "governmental officials
have no legitimate claim to testimonial evidence tending to incriminate
the person who possesses it."20 While police officials are not required to
"encourage" a person to remain silent, "they must remain at least
neutral toward her decision not to speak." 21
By contrast, the Court's other interpretation of the Fifth
Amendment, which is not known among much of the public, "does not
protect an accused's ability to remain silent but instead protects him
only from improper methods of interrogation." 2 2 Under this view, the
word "compelled" from the amendment's text is emphasized; to trigger
Fifth Amendment protection, some form of governmental compulsion is
necessary. 23 If official questioning of an individual does not employ
(citation omitted).
" Albert W. Alschuler, A Peculiar Privilege in Historical Perspective: The Right to Remain
Silent, 94 MICH. L. REV. 2625, 2625 (1996).
1'
See Albert W. Alschuler, A Peculiar Privilege in Historical Perspective, in R.H. HELMHOLZ
ET AL., THE PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION: ITS ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT 181 (1997)

(hereinafter A Peculiar Privilege). Professor Alschuler believes that Griffin v. California, 308 U.S.
609 (1965) "is the Supreme Court decision most clearly endorsing the 'right to silence'
interpretation of the Fifth Amendment." Id. at 274 n.5.
19
See Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 461 (1972) ("The privilege assures that a
citizen is not compelled to incriminate himself by his own testimony. It usually operates to allow a
citizen to remain silent when asked a question requiring an incriminatory answer.").
20 Alschuler, supra note 17, at 2625.
21
22
23

Id.
Id. at 2626 (footnote omitted).
For example, in Fisher v. United States, the Court ruled that compelled
production of

documents from the defendants' attorneys did not implicate any Fifth Amendment rights the
defendants might have enjoyed from being compelled to produce the documents themselves. See

Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 397 (1976) ("The Court has held repeatedly that the Fifth
Amendment is limited to prohibiting the use of 'physical or moral compulsion' exerted on the
person asserting the privilege.") (citations omitted); see also JOSEPH D. GRANO, CONFESSIONS,

TRUTH, AND THE LAW 135 (1993) (explaining that "the Fifth Amendment, if properly applied to
police interrogation at all, prohibits coerced or involuntary confessions. That is, in the context of
police interrogation, to 'compel' a suspect to become a witness against himself can only mean to
'coerce' a suspect to become a witness against himself."). Professor Alschuler states that Colorado

v. Connelly exemplifies the Court's other interpretation of the Fifth Amendment that focuses on
whether police use improper interrogation methods. See A PeculiarPrivilege, supra note 18, at 274
n.5. Connelly ruled that a constitutional challenge to the admission of a defendant's confession to
police must establish coercive governmental activity. See Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 167,
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coercion or its equivalent, there is no right to remain silent and the
government is permitted to use the individual's silence against him in
later legal proceedings. In this Article, I will refer to this view of the
amendment as the Court's "textual" interpretation of the Fifth
Amendment.
Shortly before the new millennium, Professor Alschuler remarked
that the Court remained ambivalent regarding its interpretation of the
Fifth Amendment, though the "right to silence" interpretation was
dominant among the public. 24 Sixteen years later, it is evident that the
"right to remain silent" that most Americans think they possess does
not exist. Three rulings from the Court over the past twelve years
demonstrate that the public's understanding of what the Fifth
Amendment protects is deeply flawed. In the first case, Chavez v.
Martinez,25 a man was shot and severely wounded during a
confrontation with police. 26 A patrol supervisor, who was not involved
in the shooting, later questioned the man over a forty-five minute
period, while the man was under arrest and receiving treatment for his
wounds at a hospital.2 7 The patrol supervisor gave no Miranda
170 (1986) ("The sole concern of the Fifth Amendment, on which Miranda was based, is
governmental coercion.") (citations omitted).
While Hollywood's frequent depiction of the Miranda warning is probably most responsible
for the public's perception that everyone enjoys a right to remain silent, Professor Alschuler
cogently explains that Chief Justice Warren's majority opinion in Miranda "appeared to embrace
both" interpretations of the Fifth Amendment:
The first Miranda warning-"You have a right to remain silent"-strongly indicated the
Court's approval of the "right to silence" interpretation. So did the Court's expansive
accusatorial rhetoric and its demand for a knowing and intelligent waiver of the
privilege as a prerequisite to the admission of any statement made by a suspect at the
stationhouse. The Court, however, did not direct law enforcement officers to provide the
Miranda warnings whenever they asked a person suspected of crime to incriminate
himself. Only suspects in custody were entitled to the warnings, and the Court referred
repeatedly to the "inherently compelling nature" of custodial interrogation. This
language and other aspects of the Miranda opinion (for example, the Court's discussion
of the stratagems that interrogation manuals encouraged law enforcement officers to use
while questioning suspects) suggested that the Court was still concerned with the
quality and extent of the pressure brought to bear on a suspect and that the Fifth
Amendment might not prohibit every inducement to speak. At the same time, much of
the Court's discussion of stationhouse interrogation indicated that it was compelling only
because it undercut the right to remain silent. A reader attempting to infer from
Mirandawhether the Fifth Amendment mandated neutrality toward a suspect's decision
to speak or remain silent could have become confused.
A Peculiar Privilege, supra note 18, at 274-75 n.5.
24
See A Peculiar Privilege, supra note 18, at 182 ("Although the Supreme Court remains
somewhat ambivalent about the issue, the 'right to silence' interpretation now seems dominant, at
least in popular understanding of the privilege.") (footnote omitted).
25
538 U.S. 760 (2003).
2

Id. at 764.

27

Id.
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warnings before questioning, nor did he stop when the man requested
that the interrogation end, all the while protesting that he was in
extreme pain. 28 The man made incriminating statements to the
supervisor, but was not charged with a crime. 29 A federal civil rights
lawsuit was filed against the patrol supervisor, claiming that the
coercive questioning violated the Fifth Amendment.3 0 The Court
rejected the claim. 31
In the second case, Berghuis v. Thompkins, 32 a person was arrested
for murder. 33 Police provided Miranda warnings to the suspect, but the
suspect refused to sign a form demonstrating that he understood those
rights. 34 Police interrogated the suspect, but the suspect remained
"[1]argely'
silent." 35 After nearly three hours of a one-sided
interrogation, a detective asked the suspect whether he believed in
God; the suspect answered "yes." 36 The detective then asked: "Do you
pray to God?"3 Again, the suspect answered "yes." 38 Finally, the
detective asked: "Do you pray to God to forgive you for shooting that
boy down?" 39 The suspect replied "yes." 40 Fifteen minutes later, the
suspect refused to make a written confession, and the interrogation
ended. 41 The suspect's answers were admitted at trial and he was
convicted of murder. 42 The Court rejected the suspect's claim that he
was exercising his Fifth Amendment right when he remained silent for
nearly three hours of police interrogation. 43
In the third case, Salinas v. Texas, 44 a suspect agreed to speak with
police about a double-murder. 4 5 Because he was not under arrest and
28

id.

29

id.

o Id. at 764-65.
Id. at 766.
32

560 U.S. 370 (2010).
Id. at 374.

Id. at 375.
Id. (citations omitted).
3S

37
'
40
41

42

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 376 (citations omitted).
(citation
(citation
(citation
(citation

omitted).
omitted).
omitted).
omitted).

Id. at 376-78.

43 Id. at 381-82 ("[The defendant] did not say that he wanted to remain silent or that he did
not want to talk with the police. Had he made either of these simple, unambiguous statements, he
would have invoked his 'right to cut off questioning."') (citation omitted).

133 S. Ct. 2174 (2013).

Id. at 2178.
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had come to the police station voluntarily, the suspect was not given
Miranda warnings. 46 The suspect answered the officers' questions, but
remained silent when asked whether a ballistics test of the shotgun
obtained from his home would match the shell casings found at the
murder scene. 47 After a few moments of silence, the suspect answered
other questions. 48 At trial, the prosecutor was allowed to use the
suspect's silence as substantive evidence of his guilt, and the jury
convicted the man of murder. 49 The Court held that using silence in
these circumstances as evidence of guilt did not violate the Fifth
Amendment.5 0
Each of these rulings demonstrates that the Fifth Amendment does
not protect all persons during their interactions or confrontations with
police and does not always protect silence. In the first case, Martinez, a
plurality of the Court concluded that the Fifth Amendment protects a
person only from coercive and unwanted interrogation when the
government seeks to admit that person's compelled statements in a
subsequent criminal prosecution.5 1 Thus, even when a person clearly
indicates his desires to be free from coercive and persistent police
questioning, he holds no right to silence and the Fifth Amendment is
inapplicable.
The second case, Thompkins, demonstrates that remaining silent
in the face of custodial police interrogation does not count for much. 52
While Miranda warnings tell a person under arrest he has a right to
remain silent, to enjoy the benefit of that right (i.e., the termination of
46

Id.

47

id.

48

Id.

49

Id.

50

Id.

"' See Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 766-67 (2003) (Opinion of Thomas, J.) ("We fail to
see how, based on the text of the Fifth Amendment, Martinez can allege a violation of this right,
since Martinez was never prosecuted for a crime, let alone compelled to be a witness against
himself in a criminal case.... The text of the Self-Incrimination Clause simply cannot support
view that the mere use of compulsive questioning, without more, violates the
the ...
Constitution."). See John T. Parry, ConstitutionalInterpretation,Coercive Interrogation,and Civil
Rights Litigation After Chavez v. Martinez, 39 GEORGIA L. REV. 733, 763 (2005) (noting that under
the plurality's analysis, "[t]he privilege is irrelevant as a source of enforceable rights if the
government never seeks to introduce the confession."). Justice Souter appeared to agree with the
plurality's view on this point, although Justice Souter's view is not crystal clear. Martinez, 538
U.S. at 777 (Souter, J., concurring in judgment) ("As [the plurality] points out, the text of the Fifth
Amendment . . . focuses on courtroom use of a criminal defendant's compelled, self-incriminating
testimony, and the core of the guarantee against compelled self-incrimination is the exclusion of
any such evidence."). Thus, one could conclude that a majority of the justices in Martinez agreed
that coercive police interrogation that produces incriminating statements does not violate the
Fifth Amendment, unless those statements are admitted at a later prosecution.
52 See Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 381-82 (2010).
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police interrogation), the arrestee must speak (and speak clearly) to
ensure the right will be protected. 53 Of course, Miranda warnings
themselves give no hint that a suspect must clearly invoke his right to
remain silent, and police detectives do not inform suspects of the need
for an unambiguous statement.
This Article focuses on the third case, Salinas, because it
demonstrates that the Fifth Amendment does not protect silence when
persons, not under arrest, are confronted with questions requiring
incriminating answers. 54 The result and reasoning of Salinas raises
some perplexing questions about the nature and scope of the Fifth
Amendment and underscores the Court's opposing interpretations of
the Fifth Amendment. A plurality of the Court ruled that Salinas's
constitutional "claim fails because he did not expressly invoke the
privilege against self-incrimination in response to the officer's question"
about the shotgun.5 5 The plurality explained that Salinas could have
easily asserted that he was not answering the question "on Fifth
Amendment grounds. Because he failed to do so, the prosecution's use
of his noncustodial silence did not violate the Fifth Amendment." 56
Implicit in this reasoning is that Salinas enjoyed Fifth Amendment
protection during his interaction with the police.
As will be discussed below, under the "right to silence"
interpretation of the Fifth Amendment, the Court's rulings establish
that when government officials subject an individual to official coercion
or its equivalent, the individual holds a right to remain silent, and the
government cannot penalize the exercise of that right. The Salinas
plurality found that Salinas could not rely on this principle because
"his interview with police was voluntary."5 7 But this conclusion raises
the question of why the Fifth Amendment is implicated during a
voluntary police interrogation. To assume Salinas enjoyed Fifth
Amendment protection in this situation contradicts the Court's
"textual" interpretation of the Fifth Amendment, which establishes
that the "sole concern of the Fifth Amendment . .. is governmental
coercion."58 If the focus of the privilege is on government compulsion, it

" Id. at 409 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (citing and quoting Soffar v. Cockrell, 300 F.3d 588,
603 (5th Cir. 2002) (en banc) (DeMoss, J., dissenting) ("What in the world must an individual do to
exercise his constitutional right to remain silent beyond actually, in fact, remaining silent?"))
("Advising a suspect that he has a 'right to remain silent' is unlikely to convey that he must speak
[and must do so in some particular fashion] to ensure the right will be protected.").
See Salinas v. Texas, 133 S. Ct. 2174, 2177-78 (2013).
Id. at 2178.
Id. at 2180.
57
8

Id.
Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 170 (1986).
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would seem that the Fifth Amendment has no application to a
voluntary police interview. Without explaining why the Fifth
Amendment applies to voluntary police questioning, the plurality finds
that Salinas had not properly asserted his rights. This conclusion,
however, as explained below, penalizes members of the public who have
understandably, but erroneously, relied on the Court's "right to silence"
interpretation of the Fifth Amendment, which supposedly grants a
right to remain silent for persons confronted with incriminating police
questioning.
The reasoning of the Salinas plurality raises another question
about the nature and scope of the Fifth Amendment. The Fifth
Amendment is stated in absolute terms; the government cannot require
a person to be a witness against himself in any criminal case. 59
Examining the text, it appears that everyone enjoys the same Fifth
Amendment protection. Unlike other provisions of the Bill of Rights
that often require the Court to balance an individual's constitutional
interest against the government's interests, the text of the Fifth
Amendment leaves no room for judicial balancing of competing
interests. Yet, the Salinas plurality contrasts the Fifth Amendment
rights of an arrestee with the Fifth Amendment rights of someone who
voluntarily comes to the police station. The arrestee enjoys a right to
silence, but the citizen who freely appears at the police station does not.
Relying on the text of the amendment, the Salinas plurality explains
that the public's understanding of their right to silence is mistaken; the
amendment "does not establish an unqualified 'right to remain
silent."' 6 0 But if the Fifth Amendment does not afford an absolute right
to remain silent for someone like Salinas, why would an express
invocation of the Fifth Amendment matter? Invoking the words of the
amendment, without more, would not change the voluntary nature of
the interview. While the plurality opinion implies that an express
invocation would make a constitutional difference, it never explains
why.

5 See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 479 (1996) ("A recurrent argument made in
these cases is that society's need for interrogation outweighs the privilege. This argument is not
unfamiliar to this Court. The whole thrust of our foregoing discussion demonstrates that the
Constitution has prescribed the rights of the individual when confronted with the power of
government when it provided in the Fifth Amendment that an individual cannot be compelled to
be a witness against himself. That right cannot be abridged.") (citation omitted); Braswell v.
United States, 487 U.S. 99, 128 (1988) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (noting that "the privilege against
self-incrimination does not permit balancing the convenience of the Government against the rights
of a witness"); Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 467 (1972) (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("The
Fifth Amendment gives an absolute right to resist interrogation, if the testimony sought would
tend to incriminate him.").
6
Salinas, 133 S. Ct. at 2183.
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Finally, even assuming that an explicit invocation of the Fifth
Amendment provides more protection than merely remaining silent, if
police are permitted to tell someone in Salinas's position that his
silence can be used against him in a future prosecution, as the Court
said they may do, 61 why would a person bother invoking the Fifth
Amendment after being told by police that silence can be used against
him? After all, most laymen, and many lawyers, believe the right to
silence is just another way of referring to the Fifth Amendment. 62
Part II of this article describes Salinas and the reasoning behind
the Court's judgment. Part III critiques the Salinas plurality opinion
and discusses the implications it has for police interrogation practices
and future Fifth Amendment cases. As the remainder of this Article
will show, the right to silence and the Fifth Amendment are not the
same. Indeed, the result and reasoning of Salinas demonstrate that the
Fifth Amendment does not afford an individual-who has neither been
indicted, nor arrested, nor temporarily detained by police-a right to
remain silent in the face of police interrogation. For this reason and
other reasons explained below, Salinas was wrongly decided.
II. SALINAS V. TEXAS

On December 18, 1992, Houston, Texas police learned of the
murders of two brothers, Juan and Hector Garza, who had been shot
and killed in their home. 63 Officers found shotgun shell casings at the
crime scene. Police later learned that Genovevo Salinas had attended a
party at the victims' home the night before the murders. 64 Several
weeks after the murders, police went to Salinas's home.65 Salinas
agreed to talk with police and told them that his father owned a
shotgun. 66 Salinas's father gave police the weapon and Salinas agreed
to come to the police station to discuss the murders.67
61
62

See id. at 2183-84.
Cf. Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 155, 163 (1955) ("Surely, in popular parlance and
even

in legal literature, the term 'Fifth Amendment' in the context of our time is commonly regarded as

being synonymous with the privilege against self-incrimination."); Richard F. Albert, The Supreme
Court's Decision in Salinas v. Texas: Implications For White Collar Investigations, FORBES, June

19, 2013, http://www.forbes.com/sites/insider/2013/06/19/the-supreme-courts-decision-in-salinas-vtexas-implications-for-white-collar-investigations/#5426d7145 1bI [perma.cclFHV9-G8EX] (noting
that the result in Salinas "would seem to be contrary to the expectation of many lawyers, much
less laypersons, that the government cannot comment at all on a suspect's silence or failure to

respond to [police] questions").
63 Salinas, 133 S. Ct. at 2178.
6

Id.

66

Id.

6

Id.
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At the police station, Salinas was taken to an interview room. 68 He
did not receive Miranda warnings.6 9 Salinas answered the officers'
questions until an officer asked "whether his shotgun 'would match the
shells recovered at the scene of the murder."' 70 Salinas declined to
answer. Instead, he "[1]ooked down at the floor, shuffled his feet, bit his
bottom lip, cl[e]nched his hands in his lap, [and] began to tighten up."71
After a few minutes of silence, the officer asked other questions, which
Salinas answered. 72
Salinas was later prosecuted for the murders. 73 At the trial, the
prosecutor characterized Salinas's silence during the police questioning
as a "'very important piece of evidence."' 7 4 The trial judge permitted one
of the officers who interviewed Salinas to testify about Salinas's silence
when asked whether the shell casings found at the murder scene would
match his father's shotgun.7 5 The officer told the jury that Salinas 'did
not answer' that question." 76 During closing argument, the prosecutor
told the jury, inter alia, that "[a]n innocent person" would have
answered the officer's question and said, "What are you talking about? I
didn't do that. I wasn't there."7 7 But Salinas, according to the
prosecutor, "didn't respond that way."78 Rather, "he wouldn't answer
that question." 79 Salinas did not testify at trial.8 0 The jury convicted
Salinas.8 1

6

Id.

69 Id. At the Supreme Court, the parties agreed that Salinas came to the station on a
voluntary basis.
7o

Id. (citation omitted).

71

Id. (citation omitted).
Id. (citation omitted).

72

7
There were two murder prosecutions of Salinas. At the first trial, the prosecution conceded
to the jury that there was no apparent motive for Salinas to kill the Garza brothers. Nonetheless,
the prosecution told the jury that a conviction was warranted based on a ballistics report matching
the shotgun given by Salinas's father to the shell casings found at the murder scene and other
evidence linking Salinas to the murders. See Pet'r's Br. at 4-5, Salinas v. Texas, 133 S. Ct. 2174
(2013) (No. 12-246). During the first trial, the prosecutor "placed little emphasis on Salinas'[s]
silence during police questioning." Id. at 5. Salinas did not testify at the first trial. Id. The jury
deadlocked and a mistrial was declared. Id. The State then decided to retry Salinas. Id.
74 Neal Davis & Dick Deguerin, Silence Is No Longer Golden: How Lawyers Must Now Advise
Suspects in Light of Salinas v. Texas, CHAMPION, Jan./Feb. 2014, at 16-17.
7
Pet'r's Br., supra note 73, at 6.
76
Id.

7
7

Id.
Id.
Id.

so

Id.

"

Id. at 7.

7
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On appeal, Salinas argued that the prosecution's use of his silence
as substantive evidence of guilt violated the Fifth Amendment, while
the State contended that the Fifth Amendment did not apply in these
circumstances because Salinas was not in custody, and thus, not
subjected to government compulsion when questioned by the police. 82
The Texas courts agreed with the State's view of the Fifth
Amendment. 83 Specifically, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals ruled
that using pre-arrest, pre-Miranda silence does not violate the Fifth
Amendment because Salinas's silence was not "compelled" in these
circumstances.8 4 In other words, because the interview was voluntary,
Salinas was not facing compulsion within the meaning of the Fifth
Amendment's Self-Incrimination Clause. 5
The Court originally granted certiorari to decide whether a
prosecutor may use "a defendant's assertion of the privilege against
self-incrimination during a non-custodial police interview as part of its
case in chief." 8 6 The lower courts were split on this issue. Rather than
decide that question, however, a majority of the Court ultimately held
that a person's silence during non-custodial police questioning can be
used as substantive evidence of guilt.8 7 In an opinion authored by
Justice Alito, three Justices concluded that Salinas did not invoke his
Fifth Amendment right during his interview with police, and thus, his

82 See State's Reply Br. at 7-8, Salinas v. Texas, 369 S.W.3d 176 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (PD0570-11) ("The Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination is not implicated
by the admission of pre-arrest, pre-Mirandasilence as substantive evidence of guilt.... The Fifth
Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination is irrelevant to a citizen's decision to
remain silent when he is under no official compulsion to speak.") (citation omitted).
8 The Court of Appeals of Texas ruled:

Absent a showing of government compulsion, the Fifth Amendment simply has nothing

to say on the admissibility of pre-arrest, pre-Miranda silence in the State's case-in-chief.
We therefore hold the Fifth Amendment has no applicability to pre-arrest, pre-Miranda
silence used as substantive evidence in cases in which the defendant does not testify.

Salinas v. State, 368 S.W.3d 550, 558 (Tex. App. Houston 14th Dist. 2011).
See Salinas v. State, 369 S.W.3d 176, 179 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012).
The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas stated:
The plain language of the Fifth Amendment protects a defendant from compelled selfincrimination. In pre-arrest, pre-Miranda circumstances, a suspect's interaction with

police officers is not compelled. Thus, the Fifth Amendment right against compulsory
self-incrimination is "simply irrelevant to a citizen's decision to remain silent when he is
under no official compulsion to speak."

Id. (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
8 Salinas v. Texas, 133 S. Ct. 2174, 2179 (2013).
" See id. at 2176. Five Justices did not agree on a specific rationale for affirming the ruling
below. However, "[w]hat is definitive about the Salinas ruling, and what did garner five votes, is
that silence during noncustodial questioning may draw an adverse inference at a trial." Brandon

L. Garrett, Remaining Silent after Salinas, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. DIALOGUE 116, 121 (2013).
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constitutional claim must fail.8 8 The plurality found that Salinas "was
required to assert the privilege in order to benefit from it."89 Justice
Alito explained: "Although 'no ritualistic formula is necessary in order
to invoke the privilege,' a witness does not do so by simply standing
mute." 90 Two other Justices, Scalia and Thomas, concurred in the
judgment. These Justices would have rejected Salinas's Fifth
Amendment claim "even if he had invoked the privilege because the
prosecutor's comments regarding his precustodial silence did not
compel him to give self-incriminating testimony." 91
Justice Alito's plurality opinion begins by explaining that the SelfIncrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment is an exception "to the
general principle that the Government has the right to everyone's
testimony." 92 Thus, to enjoy the amendment's protections, a person
must claim it at the time he relies on it. The justifications for requiring
invocation of one's Fifth Amendment right include giving the
government notice that a witness will rely on the privilege so that the
government may either argue that the testimony sought is not
incriminating, or provide a grant of immunity for the desired
testimony. 93 Also, the express invocation requirement "gives courts
tasked with evaluating a Fifth Amendment claim a contemporaneous
94
record establishing the witness's reasons for refusing to answer."
Justice Alito acknowledges, however, that the invocation
requirement is not a hard-and-fast rule. 95 There are several instances
where invocation is not necessary to benefit from the amendment's
protection. First, a defendant in a criminal trial is not required to
invoke the privilege. 96 In Griffin v. California,97 a defendant on trial for
murder refused to testify.9 8 Griffin had been seen with the victim on the
evening of her death.9 9 The prosecutor commented on Griffin's failure to
testify and the trial judge told the jury that it could draw an adverse
inference from his failure to testify. 100 The Court ruled that the

8
8

9
9'
92

See Salinas, 133 S. Ct. at 2176.
Id. at 2178.
Id. (citation omitted).
Id. at 2184 (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment).
Id. at 2179 (quoting Garner v. United States, 424 U.S. 648, 658 n.11 (1976)).

4
9

See id. (citations omitted).
Id. at 2179 (citations omitted).
See id.

96

See id.

93

9

380 U.S. 609 (1965).

98

Id. at 609.

9

Id. at 610.

100

See id. at 610-11.
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prosecutor's comment and the judge's instruction violated the Fifth
Amendment because it is "a penalty imposed by courts for exercising a
constitutional privilege. It cuts down on the privilege by making its
assertion costly."1 01 In Salinas, Justice Alito observed that the
exception to the invocation rule resulting from Griffin "reflects the fact
10 2
that a criminal defendant has an 'absolute right not to testify."'
Because a criminal defendant's motives for remaining silent at trial are
"irrelevant to his constitutional right to do so," invocation of the
privilege serves no purpose. 103 "[N]either a showing that his testimony
would not be self-incriminating nor a grant of immunity could force him
to speak." 1 0 4 But Justice Alito explained that the exception to the
invocation requirement created by Griffin was unavailable to Salinas
because he "had no comparable unqualified right during his interview
with police[.]"10 5

The Court has also recognized an exception to the invocation
requirement "where governmental coercion makes his forfeiture of the
privilege involuntary."1 06 In Miranda v. Arizona,10 7 the Court found
that persons under arrest are subjected to "inherently compelling
pressures[,]" and thus not required to invoke the privilege.1 08 Because
of the inherent compulsion associated with custodial interrogation,
Miranda mandated that police inform suspects of their rights,
Id. at 614. I agree with Professor Alschuler that Griffin's reliance on the doctrine of

1'0

unconstitutional conditions was "unnecessary." See Alschuler, supra note 17, at 2628 n.11. As
Alschuler puts it: "Rather than contend that prosecutorial comment burdens the exercise of a right
to remain silent, the majority might have argued that comment on a defendant's silence violates

the Fifth Amendment, pure and simple." Id. It is fair to acknowledge that Griffin is not held in
high esteem by some of the current justices. Indeed, "the aftermath of Griffin is a spectacularly
chaotic farrago of opinions of such complexity that only one practicing attorney in a thousand can

accurately summarize all of them off the top of her head." James J. Duane, The Extraordinary
Trajectory of Griffin v. California: The Aftermath of Playing Fifty Years of Scrabble with the Fifth
Amendment, 3 STAN. J. CRIM. & POL'Y 1, 5 (2015) (footnote omitted). Professor Duane further
asserts that:

[M]ost of the controlling rules in [the Court's post-Griffin progeny] were selected and
announced by the Supreme Court with no logical basis whatsoever, solely because they

were the only way the Court could straight-arm and pretend to be able to distinguish
earlier Fifth Amendment rulings that more recent members of the Court really do not

like but could not honestly distinguish and have not yet formally overruled.
Id. at 14.
102
Salinas v. Texas, 133 S. Ct. 2174, 2179 (2013) (quoting Turner v. United States, 396 U.S.
398, 433 (1970) (Black, J., dissenting)).
10a

Id.

104

Id.

10

Id. at 2179-80.

100

Id. at 2180.

107

384 U.S. 436 (1966).

"

Id. at 467.
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109
including their"right to remain silent," before initiating questioning.
And although the Miranda warnings contain no promise that a
suspect's silence cannot be used against him, the Miranda Court
asserted, relying on Griffin and Malloy v. Hogan,110 that "it is
impermissible to penalize an individual for exercising his Fifth
Amendment privilege" while under arrest.1 11 Thus, the prosecution is
barred from using at a later trial "the fact that [a suspect] stood mute
or claimed his privilege in the face of accusation." 112
Similarly, "threats to withdraw a governmental benefit such as
public employment sometimes make exercise of the privilege so costly
that it need not be affirmatively asserted." 113 Also, if an explicit
assertion of the Fifth Amendment would incriminate, the Court has
114
In Salinas,
recognized exercise of the privilege through silence.
Justice Alito explained that all of these cases are based on the premise
that a person is not required to expressly invoke his Fifth Amendment
right where governmental coercion prevents him from freely choosing
to admit, deny, or refuse to answer potentially incriminating
questions.1 1 5 Justice Alito concluded, however, that Salinas could not
1 16
rely on these cases because "his interview with police was voluntary."
According to Justice Alito, it would have been "a simple matter" for
Salinas to tell the police he was not answering the question about the
shotgun on "Fifth Amendment grounds."11 7 Because Salinas did not do
so, "the prosecution's use of his noncustodial silence did not violate the
Fifth Amendment."1 18
Justice Alito was unwilling to recognize a new exception to the
invocation rule for situations where a person "stands mute and thereby
declines to give an answer that officials suspect would be

109

See id. at 444.

n0 See Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 1 (1964) (applying the Self-Incrimination Clause to the
states).
' Miranda, 384 U.S. at 468 n.37.
112

id.

Salinas v. Texas, 133 S. Ct. 2174, 2180 (2013) (citations omitted).
See, e.g., id.; Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6, 18, 28-29 (1969) (holding that there was
no requirement that a taxpayer complete a tax form where doing so would have revealed income
from illegal activities, and that Fifth Amendment privilege was not waived because defendant did
not affirmatively invoke it); Albertson v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 382 U.S. 70, 77-79
(1965) (holding that members of the Communist Party were not required to complete a
might involve [them] in the
registration form "where response to any of the form's questions ...
admission of a crucial element of a crime").
"5 See Salinas, 133 S. Ct. at 2180 (citation omitted).
"

114

116

Id.

117

Id.

1s

Id.
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incriminating."' 19 Justice Alito stated that the Court's prior precedents
"foreclose such an exception, which would needlessly burden the
Government's interests in obtaining testimony and prosecuting
criminal activity." 120 Further, the fact that law enforcement officials
expect incriminating responses to their questions does not excuse a
person from invoking his Fifth Amendment privilege. 121 Thus,
remaining silent in response to official questioning is not protected by
the Fifth Amendment, unless the government employs coercion or its
equivalent. 122
Moreover, Justice Alito believed that a new exception to the
invocation requirement-remaining
silent when confronted by
questions police know are potentially incriminating-was inconsistent
with the rule announced in Thompkins. 123 As noted above, Thompkins
held that remaining silent during a police interrogation, even after
receiving Mirandawarnings, did not invoke the privilege or require the
termination of police interrogation. 1 2 4 If the two hours and forty-five
minutes of silence in Thompkins did not constitute invocation, "then
surely [Salinas's] momentary silence . . . did not do so either." 12 5 That
Thompkins involved the admission of the defendant's statements,
rather than the use of his silence as substantive evidence of guilt, did
not negate the logic of Thompkins's holding. 126 "A suspect who stands
mute has not done enough to put police on notice that he is relying on
his Fifth Amendment privilege." 127
Justice Alito was not persuaded by the argument that Salinas was
relying on the well-known "right to remain silent," and that it was
"unfair" to expect a layperson "unschooled in the particulars of legal
doctrine to do anything more than remain silent" to count on Fifth
Amendment protection in these circumstances. 12 8 Justice Alito's reply is
telling
and
worthy
of
emphasis:
"[P]opular
misconceptions
notwithstanding, the Fifth Amendment guarantees that no one may be

119
120

Id. at 2180-81.

"'

See id.

122

See id. ("A witness does not expressly invoke the privilege by standing mute."). The

Id. at 2181.

plurality saw no constitutional merit to the distinction urged by the dissent between "silence" and

"failure to invoke the privilege before making incriminating statements." See id. at 2181 n.2.
123
See id. at 2182.
121 See Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 381-82
(2010).
125 Salinas, 133 S. Ct. at 2182.
126 See id. ("[R]egardless of whether prosecutors seek to use silence or a
confession that
follows, the logic of [Thompkins] applies with equal force.").
127 Id. (footnote omitted).
121

See id. at 2182-83.
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'compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself'; it does
not establish an unqualified 'right to remain silent."' 129 A person's right
to refuse to answer questions, Justice Alito reiterated, "depends on his
reasons for doing so, and courts need to know those reasons to evaluate
the merits of a Fifth Amendment claim." 130
Finally, Justice Alito saw no cause for concern in Salinas's
argument that a ruling in favor of the government would encourage
police to unfairly trick suspects into cooperating and providing
confessions by telling them that their silence could be later used
against them. 131 Justice Alito responded by explaining that police
officers do nothing wrong "when they 'accurately stat[e] the law' to
someone in Salinas's position. 132

III. THE FIFTH AMENDMENT AFTER SALINAS
Shortly after Salinas was decided, Professor Orin Kerr predicted
that the ruling "probably won't get much attention in the press," and "is
1 33
likely to have a significant impact on police [interrogation] practices."
134
and I am confident, if the
Professor Kerr was right about the former,
past is prologue, that Salinas will enhance the power and leverage
5
police possess during noncustodial interrogation sessions.13 Professor

129

Id.

130 Id. at 2183 (citation omitted).
'

See id.

132

Id. (citation omitted).

133

Kerr, supra note 14.

The New York Times and the Los Angeles Times published a summary description of the
ruling in Salinas. See Adam Liptak, A 5-4 Ruling, One of Three, Limits Silence's Protection, N.Y.
TIMES (June 17, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/18/us/supreme-court-hands-down-threedecisions-that-are-5-to-4.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/KR6M-7SX5]; David G. Savage, In Miranda
Case, Supreme Court Rules on the Limits of Silence, L.A. TIMES (June 17, 2013),
[https://perma.cc/
http: //articles.latimes.com/2013/jun/I7/nation/la-na-court-miranda-20130618
Q3EQ-FJP2]. I could not find a story from The Washington Post on the announcement of Salinas,
although the Post did publish an editorial by David Cole that briefly mentioned (and subtly
criticized) Salinas. See Professor David Cole, Don't Let DOMA Fool You-the Supreme Court is
Restricting Your Rights, WASH. POST (June 28, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.
2
013/06/28/
com/opinions/dont-let-doma-fool-you-the-supreme-court-is-restricting-your-rights/
cdOafalc-de85-11e2-b94a-452948b95ca8_story.html [perma.cc/P6FA-63VZ]. Finally, the New York
Times published an editorial criticizing Salinas. See Editorial Board, The Court: Right and Wrong
on Criminal Justice, N.Y. TIMES (June 17, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/18/opinion/thecourt-right-and-wrong-on-criminal-justice.html [http: //perma.cc/M6AE-R3U9].
The result in Salinas did not go unnoticed by the criminal defense bar. See, e.g., Arnold
Porter LLP, Advisory, Silence as Evidence: U.S. Supreme Court Holds That the Fifth Amendment
Does Not Bar Using a Suspect's Silence as Evidence of Guilt, ARNOLDPORTER.COM, June 2013
[hereinafter Silence as Evidence]; Davis & Deguerin, supra note 74; Larry J. Ritchie & Jennifer L.
Read, Silence When Questioned By Police: Evidentiary and Constitutional Confusion, CHAMPION,
July/Aug. 2014, at 44.
As Richard Leo has described, police interrogators are committed to obtaining confessions.
135
&

"4
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Kerr also thought that Salinas was a "fascinating case for legal
nerds[.]" 1 36 I would add that Salinas is an important case for the public

as well. Salinas is significant because it undercuts the popular notion
that Americans possess a right to remain silent when questioned by
law enforcement officials.
A.

Is the Fifth Amendment Implicated During a Voluntary Police
Interrogation?

Every law student enrolled in a constitutional criminal procedure
course eventually learns that there are three elements to a valid Fifth
Amendment claim: the challenged evidence must (1) implicate the
claimant in criminal conduct; (2) contain testimonial or communicative
evidence from the claimant; and (3) be the product of governmental
compulsion directed against the claimant. 137 The Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals concluded that Salinas's silence was not protected by
the Fifth Amendment because there was no compulsion aimed at him
during the interrogation. 138 In light of this ruling, Justice Alito's
plurality opinion is noticeably vague on the Fifth Amendment's
applicability to the facts. 139 Ultimately, Justice Alito's opinion does not
See RICHARD A. LEO, POLICE INTERROGATION AND AMERICAN JUSTICE 11 (2008). Interrogators

pursue that goal by utilizing various tactics, including convincing a suspect that he is "better off by
admitting some version of guilt than by denying culpability or terminating the interrogation." Id.
As I hope to demonstrate, Salinas will enhance the ability of police interrogators to achieve their
goal of obtaining incriminating statements from suspects. There is also reason to think that
Salinas will impact future police interrogation practices. Professor Brandon Garrett believes that
Salinas "encourages police to question suspects in informal settings that not only lack clear rules,
but are not documented and therefore prone to the dangers of confession contamination." Garrett,
supra note 87, at 118 (footnote omitted), 128 (noting that cases like Salinas encourage police to
interrogate suspects "without the protections that more and more departments have adopted
precisely to prevent false and contaminated confessions").
136 Kerr, supra note 14.
13
See Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 408 (1976) (stating that the Fifth Amendment
applies only when the accused is compelled to make a testimonial communication that is
incriminating); In re N.D.N.Y. Grand Jury Subpoena, 811 F.2d 114, 116 (2d Cir. 1987) ("[T]o
establish a fifth amendment violation, [the witness] must demonstrate all three elements, namely,
compulsion, a testimonial communication, and the incriminat[ing]
nature of that
communication.").
13'
See Salinas v. State, 369 S.W.3d. 176, 179 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) ("The plain language of
the Fifth Amendment protects a defendant from compelled self-incrimination. In pre-arrest, preMiranda circumstances, a suspect's interaction with police officers is not compelled. Thus, the
Fifth Amendment right against compulsory self-incrimination is 'simply irrelevant to a citizen's
decision to remain silent when he is under no official compulsion to speak."') (emphasis added)
(footnotes omitted).
'3 Salinas argued that the compulsion needed to trigger the Fifth Amendment arose when the
police asked the incriminating question about the shotgun and the ballistics test. At that moment,
"Salinas had no option when questioned by police but to become a witness against himself.
Regardless of whether he responded to their questions or remained silent, he was creating
evidence the prosecution could use against him at trial." See Pet'r's Br., supranote 73, at 17. Thus,
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say that the Fifth Amendment was inapplicable during Salinas's
interview with the police. Justice Alito does not make that assertion
because the Court has repeatedly ruled that the Fifth Amendment
applies in myriad settings that do not involve police custody or a
criminal trial. 1 4 0 Indeed, it is settled law that the privilege:
[N]ot only protects the individual against being involuntarily
called as a witness against himself in a criminal prosecution but

the defense believed that compulsion could arise even in a non-custodial setting. One commentator
has noted that, "the Court has never suggested that there cannot be compulsion before Miranda
warnings have been issued." Andrew J. M. Bentz, The Original Public Meaning of the Fifth
Amendment and Pre-Miranda Silence, 98 VA. L. REV. 897, 929 (2012) (footnote omitted). The
commentator then asserted:
[T]here is compulsion when a person stands mute in the face of police questioning....
[T]he government cannot argue both that the person's silence is relevant and therefore
admissible because a normal person would feel compelled to speak, but also argue that
the Fifth Amendment does not apply because the person is not compelled. Such an
argument is specious. A person questioned by the police is compelled to speak because of
the cruel choices she faces: incriminate herself, lie, or stay silent and give the prosecutor
evidence of her guilt.
Id. at 929-30 (footnote omitted). Prior to Salinas, at least one member of the Salinas plurality
made clear his view that the Fifth Amendment is "a present right" and thus protects a person
before coerced statements are introduced in a criminal trial and prior to the provision of Miranda
warnings. See Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 791 (2003) (Opinion of Kennedy, J.) ("The Clause
must provide more than mere assurance that a compelled statement will not be introduced against
its declarant in a criminal trial. Otherwise there will be too little protection against the
compulsion the Clause prohibits."). Justice Kennedy went on to state that the Fifth Amendment is
"applicable at the time and place police use compulsion to extract a statement from a suspect." Id.
at 795. It should be noted that the Court has not clearly defined "on a philosophical [or
constitutional] level what makes a statement compelled or involuntary. Such effort has stumped
the Court and philosophers for as long as they have asked the question." Susan R. Klein, No Time
For Silence, 81 TEXAS L. REV. 1337, 1344 n.47 (2003).
140
Two examples should suffice: In Emspak v. United States, 349 U.S. 190, 194 (1955) and
Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 155, 163 (1955), the Court ruled that the Fifth Amendment was
properly invoked by persons who refused to answer questions asked by a congressional
investigative committee. As Professor Kamisar has remarked, "not even the dissenting justices
paused to consider whether a congressional investigation is 'a criminal case."' Yale Kamisar, A
Dissent From the Miranda Dissents: Some Comments on the "New" Fifth Amendment and the Old
'Voluntariness" Test, 65 MICH L. REV. 59, 64 n.33 (1966). In McCarthy v. Arndstein, 266 U.S. 34,
40 (1924), the Court rejected the government's argument that the Fifth Amendment "does not
apply in any civil proceeding." See also Klein, supra note 139, at 1341 (explaining that the
privilege applies in any pretrial setting where questioning may elicit an incriminating reply; "the
Court has, on numerous occasions, found the Constitution violated and ordered injunctive and
other relief, even where there was no possibility that a statement would be used in a criminal
trial, and even where no statement was generated"). For the view that as originally understood
during the Framers' era the right to silence was available outside of the courthouse, see Bentz,
supra note 139, at 901 ("[A]s originally understood the right to remain silent first attached, not
upon the reading of a Miranda-like incantation, but when the defendant reasonably believed that
her statement might be used against her at a criminal trial or lead the investigator to inculpatory
evidence."); id. at 920 (concluding that "in order for the Fifth Amendment to have meant anything
at the time of its ratification, it must have meant that one had the right to remain silent outside
the courtroom").

255]

RIGHT TO SILENCE V. FIFTHAMENDMENT

275

also privileges him not to answer official questions put to him in
any other proceeding, civil or criminal, formal or informal,
where the answers might incriminate him in future criminal
prosecutions. 141
Long before the Warren Court allegedly disfigured the meaning of
the Fifth Amendment in Miranda, the Court explained that the
application of the Fifth Amendment is not "dependent upon the nature
of the proceeding in which the testimony is sought or is to be used. It
applies alike to civil and criminal proceedings, wherever the answer
might tend to subject to criminal responsibility him who gives it."142
The unstated premise of Justice Alito's opinion in Salinas is that
the Fifth Amendment applied in theory to Salinas's interaction with
police. 143 Yet, the plurality would not afford constitutional protection to
Salinas's silence and refused to recognize his silence as invoking the
privilege because "his interview with police was voluntary." 144 But if
this is a "voluntary" interview, where is the compulsion that triggers
Fifth Amendment protection? Justice Alito's plurality opinion offers no
answer to this question. As discussed previously, under the Court's
"textual" interpretation of the privilege, a showing of government
coercion is necessary to trigger Fifth Amendment protection. Because it
was undisputed that Salinas agreed to come to the police station for
questioning and there was no evidence that police subjected Salinas to
"'
142

Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 77 (1973).
Arndstein, 266 U.S. at 40.

"3 Put differently, the Salinas plurality merely assumed for purposes of deciding the case that
Salinas was protected by the Fifth Amendment during his voluntary interrogation. Of course, that
assumption would carry no substantive weight if the question the Court originally granted
certiorari to decide-whether the prosecution may use a defendant's assertion of the Fifth
Amendment privilege during a voluntary police interview as substantive evidence of guilt-were
actually addressed by the Court. I am convinced that three justices of the current Court (Chief
Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas and Alito) agree with Justices Thomas and Scalia's
conclusion in Salinas that even an express invocation of the Fifth Amendment can be used as
substantive evidence of guilt. That result would be based on the following logic: Although an
explicit invocation of the privilege might be considered both incriminating and testimonial,
invocation of the privilege was not the product of government compulsion. Justice Kennedy's
position on this issue is unclear. As will be described below, I suspect that Justice Kennedy
believes that someone agreeing to attend a voluntary police interrogation is still protected by the
Fifth Amendment, notwithstanding the voluntary nature of the interview. See Martinez, 538 U.S.
at 791 (Opinion of Kennedy, J.) ("The Clause protects an individual from being forced to give
answers demanded by an official in any context when the answers might give rise to criminal
liability in the future."). Indeed, Justice Kennedy has stated that "the exercise of the privilege
depends on what the witness reasonably believes will be the future use of a statement [or
invocation of the privilege]." Id. If that reasoning is applied to someone in Salinas's position, then
Salinas was entitled to Fifth Amendment protection during his voluntary interrogation by the
police because someone in his predicament could have reasonably believed that an incriminating
statement could have been used in a later prosecution.
"' Salinas v. Texas, 133 S. Ct. 2174, 2180 (2013).
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coercion or its equivalent, it would seem that the Fifth Amendment had
no application to this voluntary interview. After all, "[i]t is difficult to
see how a voluntary interview could 'compel' [a person] to speak." 145 As
Justice Stevens remarked about a similar context, "[w]hen a citizen is
under no official compulsion whatever, either to speak or to remain
silent, I see no reason why his voluntary decision to do one or the other
should raise any issue under the Fifth Amendment." 146 Put Simply,
because "the ingredient of personal compulsion against [Salinas] is
lacking[,]" the Fifth Amendment is irrelevant.14 7
If the interview was "voluntary," then the Fifth Amendment did
not apply and Salinas's silence was not protected by the Constitution.
On the other hand, if the Fifth Amendment applies to this setting like
it applies to other formal or informal proceedings, as the Court's
precedents establish and as the plurality assumes without saying so,
why was Salinas's silence not protected? Having it both ways creates
confusion for both police and judges, not to mention causes uncertainty
in the minds of citizens confronted with police questioning.
I suspect Justice Kennedy, a member of the Salinas plurality, may
be partially responsible for this dilemma. During oral argument,
Justice Kennedy asked counsel for Salinas whether a person can invoke
the Fifth Amendment before receiving Miranda warnings, indicating
his understanding that a person could do so. 148 Counsel replied that

there were two separate rights being discussed-the "prophylactic right
under Mirandato have police cease asking you questions[," which "has
to be expressly invoked[,]" and the "genuine Fifth Amendment right to
149
remain silent[,]" which counsel claimed did not have to be invoked.
Justice Kennedy then replied:
Well, but it can be invoked, and that might make a big
difference. In your-in your brief, you acknowledge that most
citizens know they have a Fifth Amendment right.

...

And so if

there's-if questions are somehow troublesome, you say, I'm
invoking my Fifth Amendment right; go away, even if you're not

"' Ohio Adult Parole Auth. v. Woodard, 523 U.S. 272, 286 (1998) (ruling that an adverse
inference is permissible from silence in a clemency proceeding, which is a non-judicial postconviction process and not part of the criminal case).
146 Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 243-44 (1980) (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment)
(footnote omitted).
147
Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 329 (1973).
148
See Transcript of Oral Argument at 11, Salinas v. Texas, 133 S. Ct. 2174 (2013) (No. 12246).
14
Id. at 11-12.
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in custody, even if Miranda doesn't apply.... And your client
didn't do that here. 15 0
Eleven years earlier in United States v. Drayton,"1 which
addressed whether police must inform persons of their right to refuse to
cooperate with police during consensual encounters on a bus, 152 Justice
Kennedy asked the government's counsel the following during oral
argument:
Would it be appropriate in your view for this Court to write an
opinion in which we say that citizens have certain obligations to
know their rights and to assert their rights? That's what makes
for a strong democracy. . . . And people have a certain obligation
to assert their rights. If they don't want to be searched, they say
I don't want to be searched. Should we write that in an
opinion? 153
When he questioned the defendants' counsel in Drayton, Kennedy
asked, "[a]n American citizen has to protect his rights once in a while.
That's-that's a very bad thing?" 154 When defense counsel replied that
requiring citizens to assert their rights improperly shifts the
government's burden to prove that the encounter was consensual and
that the consent search was voluntary, Justice Kennedy stated: "The
question is whether or not the Government also has the burden to
educate citizens as to their rights in every encounter, whether or not
there isn't some obligation on the part of the citizen to know and to
exercise his rights or her rights."1 5 5 A few moments later, Justice
Kennedy told defense counsel:
It-it
seems to me this world you're creating for us is-is not
strong for the Constitution. It seems to me a strong world is
when officers respect people's rights and-and people know
what their rights are and-and assert their rights. [And say to

"

Id. at 12-13.
536 U.S. 194 (2002).
152
Id. at 197. In an opinion authored by Justice Kennedy, the Court held that police
are not
required to inform bus passengers of their right to refuse to cooperate with police asking questions
or seeking consent to search their luggage. See id. at 203-04.
Transcript of Oral Argument at 10, United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194 (2002) (No. 01631).
154
Id. at 34.
Id. at 35.
15
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the police,] I don't want to be searched.

searched. Leave me

. .

[ 2016

. I don't want to be

alone. 156

Later, during the oral argument in Salinas, the assistant to the
Solicitor General, Ginger Anders, supporting Texas's position, invoked
Drayton and Justice Kennedy's belief that citizens should know and
assert their rights (without explicitly mentioning Justice Kennedy's
name). Ms. Anders told the Court:
[T]he Court has repeatedly recognized that, when a citizen is
voluntarily interacting with police and there-there is no
coercion because it's not a custodial situation, we expect that
person to be treated as fully capable of deciding whether or not
to assert his rights. This is what the Court said in United States
v. Drayton in an analogous context, which is whether someone
has voluntarily consented to a search. The person, even if he is
not told that-that he can refuse to-to consent, we still assume
that he knew that he could refuse to consent, and, therefore, it
was a voluntary choice.
And I think you can draw the same inference here, that, when
someone-we-I think we all agree that most people knowpeople know what their Fifth Amendment rights are, and,
therefore, they can assert them when they don't face any
coercive pressure.1 5 7
I contend that for Justice Kennedy, Salinas was a flashback to
Drayton. Although Justice Kennedy certainly knows, as he explained in
another case, that the Fifth Amendment is directed against
governmental compulsion "and the Court has insisted. . . 'that the
15 8

witness not be compelled to give self-incriminating testimony[,]'a
Justice Kennedy and the other members of the Salinas plurality did
not rest their reasoning on the inapplicability of the Fifth Amendment
to this setting. There were too many precedents opposing that
conclusion, and Justice Kennedy is no fan of overruling the Court's
precedents. Without explaining why the Fifth Amendment applies to a
voluntary police interrogation, it was easier for the plurality to
announce that Salinas had not properly asserted his rights.
But when the Salinas plurality concluded that silence is not
sufficient to invoke the Fifth Amendment during a voluntary police
156

Id. at 44.
Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 148, at 49-50.
18 McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24, 35-36 (2002) (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
151
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interrogation, three members of the Court were doing more than
requiring citizens to understand and assert their rights, as Justice
Kennedy expects citizens to know and do, when interacting with police.
The plurality was also drawing a fine, formalistic line that few citizens
are likely to recognize. Counsel for Texas conceded that if Salinas had
told the police "I plead the Fifth" or "I don't want to talk anymore," a
prosecutor could not use such statements as evidence of guilt because it
would violate the Fifth Amendment. 159 Counsel saw a distinction
between Salinas "just not answering" or his mere silence, and Salinas
saying, "I don't want to answer." 160 Constructing a constitutional
distinction between a person's silence and a person saying "I don't want
to talk anymore," however, is not a principled distinction. Justice Scalia
did not seem persuaded by the distinction. Scalia asked: "Doesn't the
mere silence suggest 'I don't want to talk anymore?"' 1 6 1 Counsel
conceded, "[i]t might." 162
Without admitting it, the Salinas plurality appeared to accept the
principle that the Fifth Amendment was applicable to the interrogation
of Salinas, notwithstanding its "voluntary" nature. And Justice
Kennedy and the Salinas plurality appeared willing to accept the
notion that most people know their Fifth Amendment rights. For the
public, the Fifth Amendment means that an individual has a right to
remain silent when confronted with police interrogation. But the
Salinas plurality expects people to know more, and, more importantly,
expects people to tell police that they are asserting the right expressly
embodied in the Constitution-the Fifth Amendment. 163 That is a lot to
expect, even for Americans who are justly proud of their constitutional
Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 148, at 34-35. Of course, this argument was a bit

159

of a shift from the State's position in the Texas courts where it argued that the Fifth Amendment
had no application because Salinas voluntarily came to the police interrogation. See supra notes
82-85 and accompanying text.
160
Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 148, at 34-35. The following is the exact language
from the exchange between counsel and Justice Scalia:

Justice Scalia: That's the line you're drawing, between his-just not answering and his
saying, I don't want to answer?
[Counsel for Texas]: Correct, if I understand your question.

Justice Scalia: The latter can't be introduce[d] to the jury, but the former can?
[Counsel for Texas]: Correct.

Id.
Id. at 35.
id.
1
Earlier in his opinion, Justice Alito stated that "[a]lthough 'no ritualistic formula
is
necessary to invoke the privilege,' a witness does not do so by simply standing mute." Salinas v.
Texas, 133 S. Ct. 2174, 2178 (2013) (citation omitted). Later, Justice Alito dismissed the concern
161

162

that an express invocation requirement

would cause

confusion and line-drawing

problems

regarding what a person must say to invoke the privilege with the ipse dixit that "our cases have
long required that a witness assert the privilege to subsequently benefit from it." Id. at 2183.
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freedoms, especially when police control the atmosphere and
surroundings, and can manipulate the dialogue of a voluntary
interrogation session. 164
The Fifth Amendment "Does Not Establish an Unqualified 'Right
to Remain Silent'

B.

When Salinas argued that using his silence as substantive
evidence of guilt was "terribly unfair and terribly misleading" because
most Americans know they have a right to remain silent,16 5 the
plurality responded by citing the text of the amendment-"no
person . . shall ... be 'compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself."' 166 That text, the plurality opined, "does not establish
an unqualified 'right to remain silent."' 167 The plurality's reliance on
constitutional text is a bit curious. If the amendment's text, read
literally, is determinative, then Justice Alito is certainly correct that
the Fifth Amendment does not grant a right to remain silent. Indeed, a
literal interpretation of the text would mean that the amendment is
implicated only when the government compels a person to testify
against himself in a criminal case. 168 But the Court disavowed a literal

164

As Professor Kerr has noted:

[A]s a practical matter, it seems unlikely that a person questioned by a police officer
outside of custody is going to formally assert his Fifth Amendment right. Most people are
not lawyers, and they don't think in terms of legal formalities. And outside of custody,
the police don't have to give warnings or talk about the law. They don't have to mention
the right to remain silent and ask a suspect to waive it, knowing that the suspect can
later change his mind. They don't need to bring it up at all. And that means that they
can construct the conversation in the kind of way that makes it extraordinarily awkward
for a person to play lawyer and assert his Fifth Amendment privilege.
Kerr, supra note 14.
165 Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 148,
at 27.
166
167

Salinas, 133 S. Ct. at 2182-83 (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. V).
Id. at 2183.

168 See Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 440 (1974) ("Although the constitutional language in
which the privilege is cast might be construed to apply only to situations in which the prosecution
seeks to call a defendant to testify against himself at his criminal trial, its application has not
been so limited."). As one scholar has recognized, a literal reading of the Fifth Amendment would
allow the prosecution to introduce "evidence obtained prior to trial by police or judicial coercion"
because the words of the amendment "say nothing about evidence[.]" DERSHOWITZ, supra note 13,
at 29 (emphasis added). A strict reading of the text:

[P]rohibits the government only from compelling a person to testify-that's what 'a
witness' does-'against himself' in 'any criminal case.' Its words do not prohibit the
police from testifying about-or playing a recording of-what the defendant said when
he was merely a suspect and not yet a witness, after the police compelled him to speak
but before the criminal trial began. Nor does it prohibit a clerk from reading the
transcript of testimony the person was compelled by a judge to give in a noncriminal
case. So long as the defendant himself is not called as an actual witness by the
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reading of the text over one hundred years ago, when the government
claimed that a grand jury proceeding is not a "criminal case" within the
meaning of the Fifth Amendment. In Counselman v. Hitchcock,169 the
Court explained that the protection afforded by the Fifth Amendment
extended beyond its literal words. 170 The goal of the amendment "was to
insure that a person should not be compelled, when acting as a witness
in any investigation, to give testimony which might tend to show that
he himself had committed a crime. The privilege is limited to criminal
matters, but it is as broad as the mischief against which it seeks to
guard."17 1 As Dean Griswold instructed, whether the Fifth Amendment
should be construed in a literal manner "is a question which was raised
and answered long ago, so long ago in fact that lawyers tend to take it
for granted. But early courts saw that the protection of the amendment
itself would be an empty gesture if it was literally applied." 172
In light of these rulings, it is not obvious why the text of the
amendment resolves the issue raised in Salinas. After referencing the
text, Justice Alito notes that a person's constitutional right to refuse to
answer questions "depends on his reasons for doing so, and courts need
to know those reasons to evaluate the merits of a Fifth Amendment
claim." 173 The "notice" argument is equally curious. There was no need
to provide governmental officials "notice" that Salinas was relying on
the Fifth Amendment. The police knew that Salinas's answer to the
question regarding the ballistics test of the shotgun would be
incriminating; that is why they asked the question. Nor was this a
context where a prosecutor would seek a grant of immunity for
prosecution and compelled to give live testimony against himself at the criminal trial

itself, the text of the Constitution-literally read ...

is not violated.

Id. at 29-30 (emphasis added).
169
142 U.S. 547 (1892).
`o

Id. at 562. But cf. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 453-54 (1972) (upholding a

federal immunity statute that granted "use and derivative use" immunity, but not "transactional"

immunity, and explaining that "the conceptual basis of Counselman" is consistent with the holding
in Kastigar, but noting that some of the broad language from Counselman that suggested that an
immunity statute must grant full transactional immunity in order to be coextensive with the scope
of the Fifth Amendment privilege was unnecessary to Counselman's holding).

"' Id. Even Justice White, who issued a strong dissent in Miranda, acknowledged, a year
after Miranda was decided, that the text of the Fifth Amendment was not determinative of the
result in Miranda. See YALE KAMISAR ET AL., MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: CASES, COMMENTS,
AND QUESTIONS 669 (14th ed. 2015) (quoting JUSTICE BYRON R. WHITE, ADDRESS BEFORE THE
CONFERENCE OF CHIEF JUSTICES: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN CRIMINAL LAW (Aug. 3, 1967)) ("Is
the arrested suspect, alone with police in the station house, being 'compelled' to incriminate

himself when he is interrogated without proper warnings? . . . No ready answer to [the question
raised in] Mirandacan be found by reference to the text of the Constitution alone. The answer lies

in the purpose and history of the self-incrimination clause and in our accumulated experience.").
ERWIN N. GRISWOLD, THE FIFTH AMENDMENT TODAY 54-55 (1962).

1

7

Salinas v. Texas, 133 S. Ct. 2174, 2183 (2016) (citation omitted).
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incriminating testimony. The investigation of the murders was still
ongoing, and there was no judge in the police station to evaluate the
merits of Salinas's Fifth Amendment claim.
While the Salinas plurality may have thought that it was selfevident that the Fifth Amendment does not grant "an unqualified 'right
to remain silent[1"' 174 the plurality's description of the protection
afforded by the amendment raises some other questions. If the plurality
is correct that the amendment's text does not grant "an unqualified
'right to remain silent[,]"' 1 75 why would an express invocation of the
Fifth Amendment matter? Although the plurality implies that an
express invocation would make a constitutional difference, it never
explains why. Interestingly, both Texas and the Solicitor General,
participating as amicus curiae supporting Texas, conceded that an
express invocation might change the result. Texas's brief acknowledged
that "introduction into evidence of an affirmative assertion of the
due process
may raise
against self-incrimination
privilege
concerns [.]I"'7 The Solicitor General's brief went further when it noted

that Salinas "could have invoked his Fifth Amendment right not to
answer the question without being subject to any penalty (including the
use of that invocation at trial), but he chose to be silent instead."1 7 7 And
the Solicitor General added that someone like Salinas could invoke the
privilege "by expressly declining to be questioned in the first place[,]"
noting that lower courts "have generally treated an explicit, blanket
refusal as sufficient to invoke the Fifth Amendment."1 7 8 Interestingly,
the Salinas plurality does not acknowledge these concessions.
As a textual matter, it is not obvious why express invocation would
protect Salinas. An affirmative assertion of the Fifth Amendment's
words or a statement from Salinas that he is "pleading the Fifth" would
not alter the "voluntary" nature of the interrogation. 179 To be sure, an
express invocation signals that the person undergoing police
interrogation no longer wishes to talk with police. Thus, if police persist
174

175

id.

Id.
Resp't's Br. at 35, Salinas v. Texas, 133 S. Ct. 2174 (2013) (No. 12-246) (emphasis added).
In the Texas courts, the State took the position that a suspect has no Fifth Amendment protection
during a non-custodial interrogation with the police. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
177 Br. for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at 9, Salinas v. Texas,
133 S. Ct. 2174 (2013) (No. 12-246).
178
Id. at 28 n.5.
179
Cf. Kerr, supra note 14 ("If the defendant doesn't actually have a Fifth Amendment right
not to answer a question because an answer would not be 'compelled' as it is understood in Fifth
Amendment caselaw, what difference does it make if the defendant asserts his Fifth Amendment
What are courts supposed to do when a suspect asserts a privilege he doesn't
privilege? ...
actually have? And what are the police supposed to do when that happens?").
176
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in questioning after someone affirmatively pleads the Fifth, a strong
argument can be made that further questioning after pleading the Fifth
amounted to coercion and thus triggered the amendment's requirement
of government compulsion. If that scenario occurred, the government
should not be free to use or penalize the person's subsequent silence or
refusal to answer after pleading the Fifth. But an express invocation,
by itself, does not transform what was a "voluntary" setting into a
coercive setting. Put another way, when police are seeking
incriminating responses from a suspect during a voluntary interview,
what is the neutral principle that distinguishes mere silence from a
verbal statement "I don't want to speak any more" or refusing to accept
a police invitation to talk about the investigation at the police station?
Consulting the amendment's text does not provide an answer, and
asserting that the amendment does not provide "an unqualified 'right to
silence"' 18 0 does not help either.
Furthermore, Justice Alito asserts
Salinas's situation is
distinguishable from Griffin because Salinas "had no comparable
unqualified right during his interview with police[.]"1 81 What does this
statement mean? Declaring that Salinas did not enjoy a "comparable
unqualified right" appears to contradict what was implicit in the
plurality's opinion-that Salinas would have been fully protected by the
Fifth Amendment had he expressly invoked his right. Perhaps this
statement simply means that, unlike Griffin, who was not required to
take the witness stand at his criminal prosecution and plead the Fifth,
someone in Salinas's situation has less Fifth Amendment protection
because he is required to expressly invoke his Fifth Amendment rights.
But why does someone in Griffin's position possess greater Fifth
Amendment protection than Salinas? The text of the amendment does
not support this legal conclusion. If the text is determinative, then
Salinas is not entitled to Fifth Amendment protection because there
was no police compulsion during his voluntary questioning.
Finally, why does a person, who has neither been indicted, nor
arrested, nor temporarily detained by police, not have the same
unqualified Fifth Amendment right as someone in Griffin's
predicament? A person who initially agrees to speak with police is
certainly free to change his mind about cooperating. That person, albeit
not in custody or subject to government compulsion, is free to decline
answering an incriminating question from the police. To paraphrase
from Justice Alito's opinion, the person has "an 'absolute right not to

'o

"'

Salinas v. Texas 133 S. Ct. 2174, 2183 (2013) (citation omitted).
Id. at 2179-80.
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[answer a police question],"' and his "reasons for remaining silent at
[the police station] are irrelevant to his constitutional right to do
so[.]"182
Indeed, why does someone in Salinas's position not enjoy the same
Fifth Amendment protection as someone under arrest?1 83 The fact that
an arrestee may have received Miranda warnings should not diminish
the Fifth Amendment rights of someone who the police have not
arrested and who chooses to remain silent when confronted with an
incriminating question.18 4 In other words, why does the presumptively
innocent person not enjoy the same Fifth Amendment right as someone
being prosecuted for a crime or in police custody?1 85 As Professor Marcy
Strauss noted over a decade ago, "[t]he reading of [Miranda] warnings
does not add or subtract from an individual's right against selfincrimination." 1 86
The text of the amendment does not support distinguishing
between someone facing criminal prosecution or placed under arrest, on
the one hand, and someone in Salinas's position, on the other hand. A
plain-meaning reading of the Fifth Amendment means the government
cannot require a person to be a witness against himself in any criminal
case.1 87 Unlike the Fourth Amendment, which protects people from
182

See Salinas, 133 S. Ct. at 2179 (citations omitted).

If an arrestee remains silent during a police interrogation, his silence cannot be used as
18
evidence of guilt at a later trial. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 468 n.37 (1996) ("[I]t is
impermissible to penalize an individual for exercising his Fifth Amendment privilege when he is
under police custodial interrogation. The prosecution may not, therefore, use at trial the fact that
he stood mute or claimed his privilege in the face of accusation.") (citations omitted). Even Justice
Kennedy appears to accept this principle. In Thompkins, Justice Kennedy stated: "If [a suspect
under arrest] wanted to remain silent, he could have said nothing in response to [police] questions,
or he could have unambiguously invoked his Miranda rights and ended the interrogation."
Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 386 (2010).
"4 See Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 247 n.1 (1980) (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("I have no
doubt that if an accused were interrogated in police custody without receiving the Miranda
warnings and remained silent, that silence would be inadmissible despite the lack of warnings.").
While Justice Alito distinguished Salinas's situation from the arrestee who remains silent
188
because the arrestee is subjected to the inherent compulsion of police custody, Salinas, 133 S. Ct.
at 2185-86, one scholar has described the plurality's distinction as "absurd":
[T]hat distinction is absurd in this context, because footnote 37 in Miranda was only
talking about the rare suspect who does not submit to police pressure to talk, and has
the wisdom and temerity to remain silent; it is ludicrous to suggest that she somehow
requires (much less deserves) more legal protection or a more generous legal standard
than a suspect like Mr. Salinas, who remained mute in a noncustodial interrogation,
merely because she was subjected to greater coercive pressure that she successfully
resisted! But Justice Alito had no choice but to say this, because there was no other way
to straight-arm footnote 37 from Miranda.
Duane, supra note 101, at 10 n.52.
18
Strauss, supra note 3, at 117-18.
187 See supra note 59 and accompanying
text.

255]

RIGHT TO SILENCE V. FIFTHAMENDMENT

285

unreasonable governmental searches and seizures and often requires
the judiciary to balance an individual's interests against the
government's interests in effective law enforcement, the text of the
Fifth Amendment leaves no room for judicial balancing of competing
interests.1 88 Yet, that is exactly what Justice Alito did when he declared
that a person's "constitutional right to refuse to answer questions
depends on his reasons for doing so, and courts need to know those
reasons to evaluate the merits of a Fifth Amendment claim." 189 In any

event, the validity or "merits" of Salinas's Fifth Amendment claim were
strong. Police asked him an incriminating question that called for a
testimonial response. At that point, Salinas had essentially two choices:
answer the question or remain silent. Either way, he was providing
testimonial evidence the prosecution could use against him at trial.
Salinas remained silent, which indicated his unwillingness to answer
the question.
The Solicitor General disagreed with this analysis. He argued that
Salinas actually had three choices: "answering, invoking the Fifth
Amendment privilege, or simply remaining mute. The latter two
courses are distinct." 190 But how was Salinas supposed to know of his
Fifth Amendment rights, let alone know that invoking the Fifth
Amendment was necessary to protect his rights in these circumstances,
if he had never been informed about his rights by police nor told that
invocation was necessary, prior to questioning?1 91 If the Fifth
Amendment is applicable in this context, as the plurality assumed it
was, would a prosecutor contend that Salinas had "waived" his Fifth
Amendment rights by not invoking the Fifth Amendment explicitly?
But waiver presupposes knowledge of the invocation requirement.
What most Americans know is that they have a right to remain silent
when confronted with incriminating questions. They are unfamiliar
with the text of the Fifth Amendment, and certainly are unaware of an
invocation requirement to protect their rights. The Solicitor General
conceded that "expressly declining to be questioned in the first place"

lBS
See Braswell v. United States, 487 U.S. 99, 129 (1988) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (explaining
that "the text of the Fifth Amendment does not authorize exceptions premised on [the

government's interest in law enforcement]").

Salinas, 133 S. Ct. at 2183 (citation omitted).
Br. for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent, supra note 177, at 22.
See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467-68 (1966) ("At the outset, if a person in custody
is to be subjected to interrogation, he must first be informed in clear and unequivocal terms that
he has the right to remain silent. For those unaware of the privilege, the warning is needed simply
to make them aware of it-the threshold requirement for an intelligent decision as to its
exercise.").
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192
But
was the equivalent of invoking the privilege during questioning.
to
be
questioned
and
"declining
silence
between
difference
what is the
in the first place"? Is it the fact that the person answers one or a few
questions? The Solicitor General did not take that position because the
Court has permitted persons to selectively exercise their Fifth
Amendment rights in other contexts, 193 including grand jury
196
proceedings, 194 congressional hearings,1 9 5 and custodial interrogation.
There is no neutral reason to treat voluntary police interviews
differently.
Moreover, in "declining to be questioned in the first place," does a
person have to utter the words "the Fifth Amendment" or its text? If
Salinas had risen from his chair and moved toward the door after the
first question about the murders, would that have been enough? What
if he said "I need to speak with my lawyer before answering that
question"? Is that sufficient for invocation? While it may be true that
after being provided Miranda warnings, "[a] man need not have the
understanding of a lawyer to waive one[,]" and that the Fifth
Amendment is not offended when the police exploit a suspect's
97
it is an entirely
ignorance or stupidity during an interrogation,1
different matter to require a person to not only know that he can
remain silent when confronted with an incriminating question from the
police, but also know the intricacies of the Court's Fifth Amendment
doctrine. Although Professor James Tomkovicz was discussing what
was necessary to show a valid waiver of one's Fifth Amendment rights,

See Br. for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent, supra note 177, at
192
28 n.5 ("In addition to invoking the privilege during questioning, a suspect could do so by expressly
declining to be questioned in the first place. Courts have generally treated an explicit, blanket
refusal as sufficient to invoke the Fifth Amendment.") (citation omitted).
193 See Pet'r's Reply Br. at 22 n.4, Salinas v. Texas, 133 S. Ct. 2174 (2013) (No. 12-246) (noting
that "[t]he Solicitor General does not go so far as to argue that once a person begins participating
in a noncustodial interview, he may not invoke the Fifth Amendment to refuse to answer selected
questions").
194
See, e.g., Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 481, 486-88 (1951).
1
See, e.g., Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 155, 158, 158 n.8 (1955).
See, e.g., Miranda, 384 U.S. at 445 ("The mere fact that [a person] may have answered
'
some questions or volunteered some statements on his own does not deprive him of the right to
refrain from answering any further inquiries until he has consulted with an attorney and
thereafter consents to be questioned.").
197 State v. McKnight, 243 A.2d 240, 251 (N.J. 1968); see also Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S.
146, 166-67 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("[E]ven if I were to concede that an honest confession is
a foolish mistake, I would welcome rather than reject it; a rule that foolish mistakes do not count
would leave most offenders not only unconvicted but undetected."); Gerald M. Caplan, Questioning
Miranda, 38 VAND. L. REV. 1417, 1457 (1985) ("But guilt is personal. That another, equally guilty,
person got away with murder because of some fortuitous factor-he was more experienced in
dealing with the police, he had a poorly developed sense of guilt, he had a smart lawyer, he knew
his rights-or even because of discrimination, does not make the more vulnerable murderer less
guilty. To hold otherwise is to confuse justice with equality.") (footnote omitted).
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what he stated about waiving one's Fifth Amendment rights is apropos
here: "The policies of the [F]ifth [A]mendment privilege do not demand
rationality, intelligence, or knowledge, but only a voluntary choice not
to remain silent."19 8 Salinas remained silent when asked an
incriminating question. That action was consistent with the "policies of
the [F]ifth [A]mendment" and should have been sufficient to ensure
Fifth Amendment protection.
Furthermore, if the Fifth Amendment does not grant "an
unqualified 'right to remain silent' 199 during a voluntary interrogation,
there is no principled reason to confine that judgment to the police
station. Governmental officials and police officers question people in a
variety of settings. One prominent example that impacts many
innocent people is when police, without suspicion of criminal activity,
interrogate motorists stopped for ordinary traffic offenses about drugs,
guns, and other criminal activity unrelated to the traffic stop. Without
addressing the issue directly, the Court recently gave its imprimatur to
such activity. 200 If Salinas did not have "an unqualified 'right to remain
silent' during his interview with police, certainly a motorist stopped
for a traffic offense lacks a similar right. A unanimous Court in
Berkemer v. McCarty201 ruled that motorists stopped for traffic offenses
are not entitled to Miranda warnings. 202 The Court explained that
traffic stops, like other investigative detentions, are constitutionally
distinct from questioning at the police station. 203 Although temporarily
detained and subjected to police interrogation, a motorist stopped for a
traffic offense is not under arrest or its functional equivalent, and thus
not subjected to the coercion associated with custodial interrogation
that requires informing an arrestee of his Fifth Amendment rights. 204
If a prosecutor is free to use Salinas's silence as evidence of guilt, a
police officer should be equally free to penalize or draw an adverse
inference from a motorist's silence or refusal to cooperate. 205 Just as
"1 James J. Tomkovicz, Standards for Invocation and Waiver of Counsel in Confession
Contexts, 71 IOWA L. REV. 975, 1049 (1986) (footnote omitted).
.. Salinas v. Texas, 133 S. Ct. 2174, 2183 (2013).
200
See Rodriguez v. United States, No. 13-9972, slip op. at 5 (Apr. 21, 2015) (explaining that
the Fourth Amendment tolerates "certain unrelated investigations that [do] not lengthen the
roadside detention"). For a discussion and critique of this phenomenon, see Tracey Maclin,
Anthony Amsterdam's Perspectives on the FourthAmendment, and What it Teaches About the Good
and Bad in Rodriguez v. United States, 100 MINN. L. REV. 1939 (2016).
201
468 U.S. 420 (1984).
202
Id. at 435-42.
203

See id. at 437-38.

20

See id. at 437-38, 440.

Some police do draw negative inferences from a motorist's refusal to cooperate.
See Gary
Webb, DWB [Driving While Black], 131 ESQUIRE, no. 4, Apr. 1999, at 125 (explaining that
205
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Salinas did not possess "an unqualified 'right to silence"' 20 6 when
confronted with police questions, the motorist stopped for a traffic
offense has no absolute right to silence either. Of course, when
interpreting the Fourth Amendment, the Court has suggested that
persons, whether involved with consensual encounters with police, or
subject to Terry investigative detentions, do enjoy an absolute right of
silence, or at least a right to refuse to cooperate with police. Floridav.
Bostick 207 explained that a person not subject to detention "may decline
an officer's request [for identification or to permit a consent search]
without fearing prosecution. We have consistently held that a refusal to
cooperate, without more, does not furnish the minimal level of objective
justification needed for a detention or seizure." 208 Bostick's
pronouncement was a reaffirmation of the Court's admonition in
Floridav. Royer209 that a person approached by police:
[N]eed not answer any question put to him; indeed, he may
decline to listen to the questions at all and he may go on his
way. He may not be detained even momentarily without
reasonable, objective grounds for doing so; and his refusal to
listen or answer does not, without more, furnish those
grounds. 210
Similarly, when police are permitted to detain persons for criminal
investigation, the Court has been adamant that suspicious persons
have a right to refuse to respond to police questions, and police cannot
use that evidence of refusal to justify longer detentions or an arrest. 2 11
California Highway Patrol officers view a driver's refusal to consent to a search of their vehicle as
an indication of drug trafficking and that the vehicle contains illegal drugs).
206 Salinas v. Texas, 133 S. Ct. 2174, 2183
(2013).
207
501 U.S. 429 (1991).
208 Id. at 437 (citation omitted). Even the Solicitor General's brief in Bostick recognized
that "it
is clear that law enforcement officers may draw no [adverse] inference justifying a search or
seizure from a refusal to cooperate." Br. for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Petitioner at 25, Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429 (1991) (No. 89-1717) (cited approvingly in
Bostick, 501 U.S. at 437).
2
460 U.S. 491 (1983).
210
Id. at 498 (plurality opinion) (citations omitted); see also Rachel Karen Laser,
UnreasonableSuspicion: Relying on Refusals to Support Terry Stops, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1161, 1161
(1995) (explaining that the Court "has repeatedly held that a person's refusal to consent to a police
request during a noncoercive police encounter cannot, by itself, provide the basis for a stop or
search[,]" but acknowledging that the Court has not decided "whether a refusal to consent to a
police request can constitute a part of the basis for [an investigative] stop") (footnote omitted).
. See Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439-40 (1984) ("[T]he detainee is not obliged to
respond. And, unless the detainee's answers provide the officer with probable cause to arrest him,
he must then be released.") (footnote omitted); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 34 (1968) (White, J.,
concurring) ("Of course, the person stopped is not obliged to answer, answers may not be
compelled, and refusal to answer furnishes no basis for an arrest[.]"). Some have argued that the
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To be sure, these statements suggesting that persons have an
unqualified right to silence (or right to refuse to cooperate) come from
the Court's interpretation of the Fourth Amendment, whereas Salinas
addresses the meaning of the Fifth Amendment. Thus, one could
distinguish such acknowledgements of a right to silence by noting that
''unreasonable searches under the Fourth Amendment are different
from unwarned interrogation under the Fifth Amendment." 2 12 That "is
true but supremely unhelpful." 213
C.

"Police officers 'have done nothing wrong' when they 'accurately
stat[e] the law."'

During the oral argument in Salinas, Justice Sotomayor queried
counsel for Texas about the defense concern that if Salinas's silence
was not protected, in future cases the police would tell people who
remain silent during voluntary interrogation that their silence could be
used against them. 214 Counsel replied: "I could perceive then, Your
Honor, the-the trial court upholding a claim by the defendant that he
was coerced at that point[.]" 2 15 Why would a prosecutor concede that it
is coercive to inform a suspect his silence can be used against him?
Probably because even prosecutors acknowledge the pressure on a
suspect to talk or cooperate with the police after being told that their
silence could be used against them.
Imagine a person, without formal legal training, who works for a.
corporation or business is being "interviewed" by the police or federal"most troubling [aspect] about Salinas is that it places into the hands of law enforcement officials
the ability to make judgments and draw inferences from silence. The mere shock of hearing
accusatory questions from a police officer or federal agent could leave a lay person stunned and

wordless." Silence as Evidence, supra note 134, at 5 (emphasis added). Notwithstanding what the
Court has said about the right of persons to refuse to cooperate with police during consensual

encounters or investigative detentions, Professor Alschuler notes that the Court has not ruled on
whether a refusal to cooperate can give rise to an adverse inference of guilt and be considered
along with other evidence to prove a defendant's guilt at trial. See E-mail from Albert W.
Alschuler, Professor of Law, Northwestern University Pritzker School of Law and The University
of Chicago Law School, to Tracey Maclin, Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law (Jan.
6, 2016, 1:15 PM) (on file with author).
2
Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 441 (2000).
213
Id. at 455 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
214
See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 148, at 45-46.
215
Id. at 46. A few moments later, counsel stated:
So when an officer says-you know, I'm going to hold-hold against you your failure to
answer a question-you know, that can be something where the court might utilize as-

as-for some sort of penalties flown [sic].. . . However, if an officer says, I'm necessarily
going to use this against you, the adverse consequence may become more-more tangible
at that point. That isn't the facts of this particular case.
Id. at 46-47.
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officers. Perhaps the topic of the interview is a civil Securities and
Exchange Commission investigation into accounting fraud. 216 An officer
asks a potentially incriminating question. The person thinks, "I
probably should not answer that question, at least not without the
advice of counsel." So he remains silent. The officer then tells the
person that his silence can be used against him in a future prosecution.
What is he going to do? His first reaction is probably confusion and
then fear. Is this person going to have the legal sophistication to invoke
the Fifth Amendment? Indeed, why would a person in this situation
bother invoking the Fifth Amendment after being told by law
enforcement officials that his silence can be used against him? After all,
most laymen, and many lawyers, believe that the right to remain silent
is just another way of referring to the Fifth Amendment. And even
assuming that the person understands the difference between the right
to remain silent and the substantive protections afforded by the Fifth
Amendment, why would that person not think to himself: "If my silence
can be used against me, I guess that means invoking the Fifth
Amendment can be used against me as well." At this point, the person
will probably look for an "exit strategy"-how can I get out of this
predicament? Perhaps the person will consider leaving the
interrogation. But if his silence can be used against him, as the police
have told him, then leaving might be used against him as well.
Confused, and likely intimidated, the person is now vulnerable to the
illusion created by the police that he "is better off by admitting some
version of guilt than by denying culpability or terminating the
interrogation." 217
Despite the prosecutor's concession that police telling a suspect his
silence can be used against him at a later trial is likely coercive, the
Salinas plurality saw things differently. The plurality rejected the
argument that an express invocation requirement would encourage
police to illegally trick suspects into cooperating by telling them that

216 Sometimes a person may think he is being questioned about a civil matter and
may not
realize that he is the target of a criminal investigation. Criminal defense lawyers have noted that
prosecutors are "increasingly using so-called parallel investigations to insert criminal
investigators into what their targets thought were civil proceedings." See James B. Stewart, A
Dragnet at Dewey & LeBoeuf Snares a Minnow, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 14, 2014), http://www.
nytimes.com/2014/03/15/business/an-underling-among-the-officials-accused-of-fraud-at-dewey.
html [perma.cc/W3R3-VECB] (describing the indictment of a former low-level employee at a major
New York City law firm for accounting fraud); see also Silence as Evidence, supra note 134, at 4
("Accordingly, after Salinas, potential targets of white collar investigations should be especially
sensitive to the risks of cooperating with any governmental inquiry without counsel, because the
prospect of criminal charges is not always immediately apparent, particularly where liability rests
on a complex statutory or regulatory analysis.") (emphasis added).

217

LEO, supra note 135, at 11.
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their silence could be used in a future prosecution. 218 Police officers do
nothing wrong when they 'accurately stat[e] the law' to someone in
Salinas's position by telling them that their silence can be used against
him at a later prosecution. 2 19 The plurality saw no danger or any
constitutional vice in this type of interview tactic.

220

While the Salinas plurality disagreed that police are coercing
suspects when they accurately describe the law in these circumstances,
there should not be much disagreement over the practical effects of the
plurality's dicta. Allowing police to tell someone in Salinas's situation
that his silence can be used against him encourages a "question first,
arrest later" approach to interrogation. 2 2 1 After Salinas, police can
"conduct noncustodial questioning of a suspect-even when probable
cause exists to arrest him-knowing that he will rarely assert the
privilege and that anything else he does, whether he speaks or remains
silent, can be used against him." 2 2 2 If the suspect remains silent when
confronted with an incriminating question, the police can "accurately
stat[e] the law" 2 2 3 and tell him his silence can be used against him.
That may produce cooperation or an incriminating statement for the
reasons described above. On the other hand, if the suspect remains
silent, the silence can be used as substantive evidence of guilt at a later
trial, as authorized by Salinas.224 Either way, the police win.
IV. CONCLUSION
Justice Thurgood Marshall once remarked: "The furnishing of the
Mirandawarnings does not create the right to remain silent; that right
is conferred by the Constitution." 2 2 5 The result in Salinas, however,
teaches that the right to silence and the Fifth Amendment are not the
same. In fact, Salinas clarifies that the Fifth Amendment does not
confer a right to silence.

218
219

See Salinas v. Texas, 133 S. Ct. 2174, 2183 (2013).
Id. (citing Pet'r's Br. at 32, Salinas v. Texas, 133 S. Ct. 2174 (2013) (No. 12-246)).

220

See id.

221

See Davis & Deguerin, supra note 74, at 19.
id

222

Salinas, 133 S. Ct. at 2183.
See id. at 2180 ("Because he failed to [invoke the privilege], the prosecution's use of his
non-custodial silence did not violate the Fifth Amendment.").
Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 247 n.1 (1980) (Marshall, J., dissenting); see also
Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 788, n.3 (2003) (Opinion of Stevens, J.) ("A person's
constitutional right to remain silent is an interest in liberty that is protected against federal
impairment by the Fifth Amendment and from state impairment by the Due Process Clause of the
2

Fourteenth Amendment.").
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There was a time when lawyers would advise their clients "to make
no statement to police under any circumstances." 226 After Salinas, that
guidance is no longer competent legal advice. Lawyers must now tell
their clients to expressly invoke the Fifth Amendment. 227 The Salinas
plurality concludes that someone who agrees to speak with police must
"expressly invoke the privilege against self-incrimination" when
confronted by police questioning in order to be protected by the Fifth
Amendment. 228 Does this mean that the person must use the words
"Fifth Amendment"? How will most Americans, who are not lawyers,
know which particular words are legally magic? What if the person
says: "Let's discuss something else," or "I'm not sure I want to answer
that [question,]" or the person simply leaves the room? 2 2 9
Salinas was wrongly decided. I say this not because I want
someone like Salinas, a convicted murderer, to be freed from prison.
Nor do I romanticize noncooperation with the government. There is
nothing wrong with law enforcement officials questioning a person
about whether he has been involved with criminal conduct. But there
are many legitimate reasons why a person, innocent or guilty, 23 0 Will

remain silent when confronted by police interrogation. Perhaps he is
confused about the topic. The person may be scared or intimidated by
See Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 59 (1949) (Opinion of Jackson, J.) (noting that under our
adversarial system, "any lawyer worth his salt will tell the suspect in no uncertain terms to make
no statement to police under any circumstances").
227
Cf. Davis & Deguerin, supra note 74, at 19 ("It is no longer sufficient for defense attorneys
to tell suspects to keep their mouths shut or ignore messages and letters from the police. The
defense must tell suspects to expressly invoke their right against self-incrimination if
governmental agents try to question them. Counsel should explain to the suspect that, even when
the police or a prosecutor tells the suspect his silence can be used against him, he can-and
should-invoke his right against self-incrimination.").
228 See Salinas, 133 S. Ct. at 2178.
229
See id. at 2190 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
m Not too long ago, the Court cautioned against viewing a person's silence as the equivalent
of a confession. "The rule against adverse inferences is a vital instrument for teaching that the
question in a criminal case is not whether the defendant committed the acts of which he is
accused. The question is whether the Government has carried its burden to prove its allegations
while respecting the defendant's individual rights." Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314, 330
(1999), see also Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 426 (1956) (quoted approvingly in
Mitchell, 526 U.S. at 329) ('"Too many, even those who should be better advised, view th[e]
privilege as a shelter for wrongdoers. They too readily assume that those who invoke it are either
guilty of crime or commit perjury in claiming the privilege."). It is an open question whether a
majority of justices on today's Court believes that an innocent person has a good reason for
remaining silent or asserting the privilege when confronted with an incriminating question from a
law enforcement official. Cf. Duane, supra note 101, at 6-7 (explaining that while Griffin "was
based on the fact that the privilege protects the innocent as well as the guilty because even
innocent people have 'many reasons' for asserting the privilege," the Court has also stated "in
complete contradiction [of Griffin and its progeny] that a person's decision to assert the privilege
logically and naturally supports the inference that he is guilty, because only guilty people have
anything to fear from telling the truth").
226
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police. The person may be following the advice of his lawyer. Finally,
the person undergoing police questioning may believe that the
Constitution guarantees him a right to remain silent. Popular
understandings of the privilege are relevant to the Court's
determination of the Fifth Amendment's protective scope. As Justice
Kennedy once observed: "[a] Constitution survives over time because
the people share a common, historic commitment to certain simple but
fundamental principles which preserve their freedom." 231 One of those
fundamental principles is the common understanding, which "has
prevailed for generations now," 2 3 2 that individuals enjoy a right to
remain silent when questioned by the police. Salinas was wrongly
decided because many persons, relying on what they perceive to be
their constitutional right, would respond to police interrogation exactly
the way Salinas responded-by remaining silent.

23
232

Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 794 (2003) (Opinion of Kennedy, J.).
Id.

